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歡迎收聽「長者法網智多聲」。說到2008年金融海嘯，相信很多人也會記得「雷曼兄弟」跟「迷你債券」。這次海嘯令很多投資者蒙受損失，而特區政府也很快地採取更多措施，希望更好保護投資者。這一節我們會跟大家說一說這件事情的來龍去脈。
2008年，雷曼兄弟倒閉，購買了雷曼零售投資產品的投資者，都損失慘重。有投資者投訴，說是銀行或經紀「不當地」向他們銷售「雷曼迷你債券」。他們認為，「迷你債券」這個詞彙有誤導性，因為這些投資產品，其實是「結構性產品」。這些產品實質的機制及性質都很複雜，一般市民，特別是老人家，根本不一定明白是甚麼。
投資者說，銀行職員或經紀推薦投資者購買「迷你債券」時，只是向他們簡單地介紹，說產品「保本」、跟「定期存款相似」、或「低風險投資」，還可以有「可觀的年息」。不過，現實情況是，當雷曼兄弟申請破產保護之後，「迷你債券」大幅貶值，甚至令投資者的本金化為烏有。
另一方面，銀行和經紀就說，他們已經向投資者派發了宣傳單張和說明書，清楚列明這些產品不保本，並且跟雷曼兄弟等公司的信貸掛鈎，亦有清楚披露風險。
結果事件引發一連串的糾紛。香港金融管理局將不當銷售迷你債券個案，轉介給證券及期貨事務監察委員會（即證監會），由證監會進行調查，找到足夠犯錯證據就提出檢控。根據法例，任何人欺詐地、或罔顧實情地，誘使其他人以金錢投資，就是犯法。有些銀行職員就因此被檢控。
不過，就算成功控告銀行職員或金融機構，受害的投資者都不會自動獲得賠償。要追討損失了的金錢，就要另行進行民事訴訟。除了打官司之外，投資者跟銀行或金融機構，也可以透過調解和仲裁，解決糾紛。
而在雷曼迷你債券事件之後，證監會修訂了「證券及期貨事務監察委員會持牌人或註冊人操守準則」，加強保障投資者。修訂包括要求分銷商將客戶分類，如果客戶對衍生工具不太認識，就要更解釋清楚產品可能有甚麼風險，給予客戶適當的意見和警告，並保存與客戶溝通的記錄。另外，分銷商在分銷投資產品之前，要披露是否從產品發行人獲得任何收益，並要向投資者披露所有相關資料。而投資者簽署合約購買投資產品之後，可以在冷靜期內改變主意。
政府不時都有廣告，提醒市民投資要做足功課和評估風險，作為醒目的老友記，在進行任何投資之前，都要考慮清楚呀。這一節就說到這裡，多謝大家收聽。
PrintBackground
On 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (LBHI) filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. Subsequently, eight Lehman companies have been put into liquidation in Hong Kong. As a result of this, investors who had purchased Lehman retail investment products suffered huge losses and blamed banks or brokers for “mis-selling” Lehman “minibonds” to them.
Some investors may regard the term “minibonds” as misleading in that these investment products are not actually “bonds”, but are “structured products”. The exact mechanism and nature of these products are very complex and may not be comprehensible to ordinary citizens (especially senior citizens) unless they are seasoned investors having in-depth knowledge of the financial market.
To put it simply, these structured products were tied to LBHI’s credit risks. They were sold as a way for the company to generate revenue, and that revenue was lost during the sub-prime mortgage crisis.
When investors purchase “minibonds” at the recommendation of bank officers or brokers, very often, they only heard a brief presentation from the bank officer or broker in person, or even heard only a brief presentation over the telephone.
Some investors complained that they were told the products were “principal-protected” or “100% principal protected notes”, which were “like a time deposit”. These products were sold as “a safe alternative to buying stocks” and “a low risk investment”. The investors would be entitled to the “promised annual interest”. Contrary to what the investors were led to believe, after LBHI filed for bankruptcy, the “minibonds” devalued to such an extent that the investors saw their principal investment sum vanish into thin air.
The banks and brokers, on the other hand, argued that the investors were all supplied with advertising brochures which stated very clearly that these products were not principal-protected and that they were “linked to the credits” of various companies including LBHI. The banks and brokers also argued that they provided investors with prospectuses that contained clear risk disclosures.
However, as previously stated, the mechanism and nature of these products are highly complex. Most investors would not be able to understand how they work even after reading the prospectus.